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PERSONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND NORMATIVE POWER
SKEPTICISM
Jody S. Kraus∗
Companion to: Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and
Promise, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1603 (2009).
Correspondence accounts of the relationship between contract and
promise hold either that contract law is justified to the extent it enforces
a corresponding moral responsibility for a promise or unjustified to the
extent it undermines promissory morality by refusing to enforce a
corresponding moral responsibility for a promise.
In “The
Correspondence of Contract and Promise,” I claim that contract scholars
have mistakenly presumed that they can assess the correspondence
between contract and promise without first providing a theory of selfimposed moral responsibility that explains and justifies the promise
principle.1 To illustrate the dependence of correspondence accounts of
contract law on a theory of self-imposed moral responsibility, I
demonstrate how a “personal sovereignty” account of individual
autonomy—one of the most familiar and intuitive theories of selfimposed moral responsibility—explains how and why, contrary to
existing correspondence theories, promissory responsibility corresponds
to the objective theory of intent, the doctrines of consideration and
promissory estoppel, and most remedial contract doctrines, including
the bar against mandatory punitive damages, the foreseeability limitation
on consequential damages, the mitigation doctrine, and expectation
damages, the paradigm example of a contract doctrine alleged to
conflict with promissory morality. I conclude that correspondence
theorists can defend their critiques of contract law only by rejecting the
personal sovereignty theory of self-imposed moral responsibility,
defending an alternative theory, and explaining why any resulting
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divergence between contract law and its requirements is objectionable.
The personal sovereignty account of promising therefore plays a
crucial role in my analysis of correspondence theories of contract. For
purposes of that analysis, I described how personal sovereignty explains
promissory obligation:
[P]ersonal sovereignty . . . recognizes the fundamental right of
individuals not only to choose their system of ends but also to
choose how to pursue those ends. Promising constitutes a
particularly valuable means for pursuing ends. . . . [I]f morality
itself can provide individuals a valuable means of pursuing their
ends simply by recognizing the individual moral power to
undertake self-imposed moral responsibilities, a moral theory
committed to personal sovereignty as a fundamental moral
value would have no grounds for refusing to recognize such a
power.
Personal sovereignty therefore counts the moral
capacity to undertake self-imposed moral responsibilities as a
basic individual liberty. By affirming the fundamental right of
individuals to choose how to pursue their desired ends,
personal sovereignty necessarily affirms the category of moral
responsibility that obligation describes. The moral power to
make—and thus the moral obligation to keep—a promise is
therefore an axiom of personal sovereignty.2
According to this account of promising, individuals have the
normative power to undertake self-imposed moral responsibilities (i.e.,
moral obligations) because such a power enhances personal
sovereignty.3 A moral theory with a foundational commitment to
personal sovereignty would therefore give moral effect to attempts to
undertake such a responsibility. Although I find this an intuitive
understanding of the logic of moral justification, some philosophers
have doubted that morality can simply “give moral effect” to attempts to
create moral responsibility. They argue that this view begs the
fundamental question of whether individuals have the normative power
to create moral responsibilities, as promises purport to do, by simply
communicating an intention to undertake such responsibility. In Part I
of this companion piece, I explain the skeptical argument that has been
leveled against other theories of promissory obligation. In Part II, I
argue that it has no force against the personal sovereignty account I
offer.

2. Kraus, supra note 1, at 1609.
3. For the distinction between moral obligations and duties, see id. at 1614 (“Moral
duties designate those responsibilities to which morality subjects individuals solely by
virtue of their status as moral agents alone, while moral obligations designate those
responsibilities to which morality subjects moral agents only if they have voluntarily
chosen to undertake them. Unlike moral duties, moral obligations are self-imposed.”).
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I. THE SKEPTICAL ARGUMENT
Joseph Raz’s account of promissory obligation holds that promises
are morally binding because many intrinsically valuable special
relationships are possible only if they are.4 Raz’s view therefore holds
that individuals have the normative power to promise because such a
power would be valuable. The contemporary version of the skeptical
argument rejects this argument. Thus, Michael Pratt argues:
That it is desirable to be able to bind oneself to another by
means of communicating an intention to do so, provides no
reason to suppose that it is possible to obligate oneself in that
manner. The value of making binding promises does not, in
other words, provide any reason for thinking that the rule that
promises ought to be kept is valid.5
Pratt here echoes an objection that Don Regan years ago leveled against
Raz’s account of why consent is morally binding. Regan takes the claim
that consent is morally binding to mean that consent provides an
individual with a reason for action that weighs in the ultimate balance of
his reasons for acting in accordance with his consent. Regan explains,
however, that Raz’s argument proceeds from the premise that “[i]t
would be a good thing if consent were binding” to the conclusion that
“[c]onsent is binding.”6 But the argument form “It would be a good
thing if X. Therefore, X” is a nonsequitur. Thus, Regan claims, the
argument “It would be a good thing if promises were binding.
Therefore they are,” is invalid as well.7 Although Regan acknowledges
that no one believes the general argument form is valid—no one believes
that we can simply infer that X is true because it would be a good thing if
X were true—he speculates that philosophers believe it is valid when
4. According to Raz,
[A promise] creates a special bond, binding the promisor to be, in the matter of
the promise, partial to the promisee. It obliges the promisor to regard the claim
of the promisee as not just one of the many claims that every person has for his
respect and help but as having peremptory force. Hence, [promissory obligation]
principles can only be justified if the creation of such special relationships
between people is held to be valuable. . . . [Promissory obligation] principles
[depend] on the intrinsic desirability of forms of life in which people create or
acknowledge special bonds between them and certain other individuals.
Joseph Raz, Promises and Obligations, in Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of
H.L.A. Hart 210, 227–28 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977) [hereinafter Raz, Promises
and Obligations].
5. Michael Pratt, Promises, Contracts and Voluntary Obligations, 26 Law & Phil. 531,
567 (2007). Similarly, Pratt writes that “[e]lsewhere Raz writes that ‘promises are binding
because it is desirable to make it possible for people to bind themselves and give rights to
others if they so wish.’ If by ‘binding’ Raz means ‘morally binding’ then, again, the
objection is manifest: that it is desirable does not make it so.” Id. at 567 n.84 (citation
omitted) (quoting Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, 46 Proc. of
the Aristotelian Soc’y (Supplementary Volumes) 79, 101 (1972)).
6. Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz’s Morality of Freedom, 62
S. Cal. L. Rev. 995, 1036–37 (1989).
7. Id. at 1037.
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applied to morality:
The underlying idea would be that morality is not a set of facts
about the universe, but rather a set of ideas and practices we
invent. So, if we have a moral belief, and if it is a good thing
that we have that moral belief, that is all the warrant one could
possibly want for saying the moral belief is true.8
Regan rejects this view, roughly, because he believes that whether an
action is morally right or wrong turns on moral facts independent of our
beliefs about our moral responsibilities. For Regan, an action is morally
right or wrong because of its consequences: “[P]eople ought to do acts
which can be expected to have good consequences.”9 The moral
assessment of actions, therefore, turns on whether they promote good or
bad consequences.10 Thus, Regan concludes that promises are not
morally binding—they do not provide the promisor with a reason for
keeping the promise that always weighs in the balance of his reasons for
action. Instead, their moral force depends entirely on the consequences
of keeping them. That the promisor promised to do the act provides no
independent reason for doing it. Regan concludes that whether it would
be a good thing, from some point of view, that a promise created a moral
obligation to perform the promised act has no bearing on whether it in
fact does create a moral obligation.
David Owens traces this fundamental skepticism about the moral
force of promising back to David Hume. Owens reconstructs Hume’s
problem nicely:
What makes breach of promise a wronging is that someone has
communicated the intention that it be a wronging . . . . Now
something can be declared to be wrongful in this way whether
or not it is harmful or constitutes unjust enrichment, or has any
further feature in which human beings might sensibly take an
interest. So such wrongfulness raises the problem of bare
wronging: What sense is there in refraining from doing
something simply because it has been declared to be wrongful?
Conversely, how could bare wronging, wrongings which have
no adverse effect on anything that matters to us come into
being unless we do indeed have the power to create them by
declaration?11
8. Id. at 1037–38.
9. Donald H. Regan, Reasons, Authority, and the Meaning of “Obey”: Further
Thoughts on Raz and Obedience to Law, 3 Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence 3, 27 (1990)
[hereinafter Regan, The Meaning of “Obey”].
10. For example, Regan suggests “[t]hat an act is one of relieving suffering is an
intrinsic reason for doing the act—the relief of suffering matters in itself.” Id. at 26.
Regan does allow that promising might provide an evidentiary, and therefore defeasible,
reason for performing the promised act if it could be shown that promise-keeping is on
average conducive to promoting good consequences. But on this view, promises are only
prima facie binding. They do not bind when the promisor reasonably believes that
performance does not promote good consequences. In such instances, rather than
providing a reason for action that is outweighed by other reasons, the promise provides
no reason for action at all.
11. David Owens, The Problem with Promising 7 (Feb. 12, 2009) (unpublished
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As Owens explains, the puzzlement underlying this question stems from
the assumption that it “makes sense to do something because you are
obliged to do it only if the discharge of this obligation would serve some
interest, where the interest in question can be specified without using
the notion of an obligation.”12 Most promise theorists presume that this
interest must be a human interest, something which it makes sense to
want or value.13 So the problem is to explain why keeping a promise
serves some sensible interest or value that human beings have. But
unless the relevant interest or value is necessarily promoted by keeping a
promise, or necessarily undermined by breaking a promise, any account
of promising that traces its moral force to its effects on a distinct interest
or value will render promissory obligation contingent, dependent
entirely on whether keeping a promise in any given instance promotes
that interest or value. So conceived, it seems impossible to provide an
account of promising that vindicates the common belief that promises
create moral obligations irrespective of the consequences of breach—
that promises always provide promisors with a reason to perform the
promised act, even if those reasons might sometimes be outweighed by
other competing reasons. In short, the skeptical argument originating
with Hume and reformulated by Regan and Pratt claims that promising
could create a genuinely deontic obligation only if promise-breaking
necessarily undermines some independent human interest or value.14
II. A DEONTIC REPLY
In this Part, I explain how the personal sovereignty account of
promising I offer provides a deontic foundation for promissory
obligation that does not depend on the effects of promise-keeping or
promise-breaking. In so doing, I explain why I reject the implicit
premise that underwrites Humean skepticism.
The personal sovereignty account of promising has much in
common with the account of promising Raz defends. According to Raz:
[T]o acknowledge the validity of voluntary obligations . . . is to
accept a rather unfashionable view of practical reason. It is a
view according to which what a man ought to do depends not
only on the ways things happen to turn out in the world . . . .
working paper, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342060.
12. Id. at 3.
13. Id.
14. I use the term “deontic” here to describe any moral theory that does not reduce
an action’s moral rightness or wrongness entirely to its consequences. See e.g., Larry
Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2007), at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethicsdeontological/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[D]eontological theories are best
understood in contrast to consequentialist ones. . . . [D]eontologists of all stripes hold
that some choices cannot be justified by their effects—that no matter how morally good
their consequences, some choices are morally forbidden. . . . For deontologists, what
makes a choice right is its conformity with a moral norm.”).
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What one ought to do depends in part on oneself . . . [in part]
because the agent has the power intentionally to shape the
form of his moral world, to obligate himself to follow certain
goals, or to create bonds and alliances with certain people and
not others. It seems to me that many have become so
preoccupied with the way considerations of human welfare
affect what one ought to do that they become blind to the
existence of this other dimension to our practical life.15
I share Raz’s conviction that promising is a crucial moral device for
pursuing one’s projects and creating special relationships. This much,
which few would doubt, is enough to explain why individuals would care
about having the power to undertake self-imposed obligations. But Raz
also argues that promises create moral obligations only “if the creation
of . . . special relationships between people is held to be valuable.”16 As
we’ve seen, for Raz, the justification of promissory obligation depends on
“the intrinsic desirability of forms of life in which people create or
acknowledge special bonds between them and certain other
individuals.”17 Thus,
The right to promise is based on the promisor’s interest to be
able to forge special bonds with other people. . . . Those who
assign sufficient importance to the interest people have in
being able to impose on themselves obligations to other people
as a means of creating special bonds with other people believe
in a right to promise. . . . [P]eople’s interest in being able to
bind themselves is the basis of a power to promise which they
possess and of an obligation to keep promises they make.18
The personal sovereignty account, however, does not ground the
normative power to make, and the moral obligation to keep, a promise
on its causal effects, including their role in facilitating the pursuit of
projects and forming special relationships. Instead, it derives the
normative power to make, and the moral obligation to keep, a promise
from the foundational normative premise that individuals are morally
entitled to decide how to live their lives as they see fit, consistent with a
like liberty for others. The personal sovereignty account understands
Raz’s conclusion that “the agent has the power intentionally to shape the
form of his moral world”19 to follow not from the valuable activities and
relationships it makes possible but from the same prior normative
commitment to a conception of the individual as sovereign over all
matters exclusively affecting his own life. Just as individuals have the sole
15. Raz, Promises and Obligations, supra note 4, at 228.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 173–74 (1986) [hereinafter Raz, Morality
of Freedom]. Similarly, Raz argues:
[T]he power to promise and the right to promise are distinct notions. But both
stem from a common core, i.e. the interest of persons to be able to forge
normative bonds with others. That is why they coexist, and one has the power to
promise if and only if one has the right to do so.
Id. at 174.
19. Raz, Promises and Obligations, supra note 4, at 228.
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right to decide whether they will eat meat, devote themselves to a
meditative practice, or become a lawyer, so they can decide for
themselves whether to undertake a moral responsibility they are
otherwise free to avoid.
If morality is committed to the value of personal sovereignty, then it
affords individuals the maximum morally permissible control over “the
shape of their moral world.” To be sure, a moral theory that recognizes
the fundamental value of personal sovereignty cannot delegate
individuals’ control over the moral duties to which they are subject
because these are grounded in the principle of equal respect for the
personal sovereignty of all individuals. To enhance one individual’s
personal sovereignty by allowing him to avoid moral responsibility to
others necessarily and simultaneously diminishes respect for the
personal sovereignty of the other individuals to whom that individual
would no longer be morally responsible. Moral duties therefore define,
rather than fall within, the realm over which individuals are personally
sovereign. In contrast, by recognizing the power of individuals to
undertake moral obligations, morality enhances everyone’s control over
their lives—their power to “shape the form of their moral world”—
without diminishing the personal sovereignty of others.
Thus, although this account of personal sovereignty does not rest on
its role in enabling individuals to realize valuable relationships or to
pursue their valuable projects, it is nonetheless animated by the same
ideas that inform the conception of autonomy that Raz embraces:
The ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that
people should make their own lives. The autonomous person is
a (part) author of his own life. The ideal of personal autonomy
is the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own
destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout
their lives.20
If morality imposes duties and recognizes rights that it derives from the
values it takes to be fundamental, and personal sovereignty is among the
fundamental values morality affirms, then morality must recognize the
duties and rights derived from personal sovereignty. The ability to
undertake self-imposed moral obligations enhances personal sovereignty
by affording individuals more control over the norms that apply to them.
A moral theory therefore cannot consistently affirm the fundamental
value of personal sovereignty and yet deny the power and obligation of
promising.
The personal sovereignty account of promissory responsibility,
however, appears to commit precisely the fallacy that Hume, Regan, and
Pratt have identified. Having the normative power to create self-imposed
obligations by promising may well enhance personal sovereignty. Yet the
skeptical view denies that this constitutes an argument to demonstrate
that such a power exists. As Regan puts the point, from the fact that it

20. Raz, Morality of Freedom, supra note 18, at 369.
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would be desirable if something were true, it certainly does not follow as
a general matter that it is true. Why should this be otherwise when it
comes to moral truth? Perhaps personal sovereignty does not include
the power to undertake self-imposed moral obligations because selfimposed moral obligations simply do not exist. One can no more
demonstrate the existence of the normative power of promising by
observing that this power would enhance personal sovereignty than one
could demonstrate the existence of a million dollars in my bank account
by observing that this money would enhance my financial sovereignty.
What is needed is an argument explaining how promissory obligation is
possible, not an argument demonstrating why it would be a good thing if
it were.
The skeptical argument proceeds, however, on the basis of a crucial
suppressed premise that Owens has identified: “[T]he problem of bare
wronging arises only if we impose some substantive constraints on what
kinds of consideration can make sense of an action.”21 Thus, many
philosophers believe that an adequate account of promissory obligation
must provide an account that explains the moral force of a promise in
terms of more basic, normatively primitive, values and interests, such as
fairness, reciprocity, well-being, harm, and the like. Hume accounts for
promissory obligation by explaining its role in providing valuable social
coordination. Regan would be satisfied by an account of promissory
obligation that demonstrated why making and keeping promises
reduced human suffering.22 Pratt accounts for promissory obligation by
explaining its role in providing valuable assurance.23 And even Raz
ultimately traces the normative power of promising to its role in
facilitating valuable relationships. In this sense, all of these philosophers
are deeply consequentialist about the normative force of promissory
morality.
The personal sovereignty account, however, explains promissory
morality not on the consequentialist ground that it promotes some other
moral value, but on the purely deontic ground that it derives from a
fundamental moral value.24 In Regan’s terms, it claims that personal
21. Owens, supra note 11, at 7.
22. “That an act is one of relieving suffering is an intrinsic reason for doing the act—
the relief of suffering matters in itself. That is what we believe about the relief of
suffering . . . .” Regan, The Meaning of “Obey,” supra note 9, at 26 (internal quotation
marks omitted). However, Regan in fact offers no such account and believes promises do
not generate genuine moral obligations.
23. See Michael Pratt, Promises and Perlocutions, in Scanlon and Contractualism 93
(Matt Matravers ed., 2003).
24. Although the personal sovereignty account of promissory morality is distinct from
Kant’s, both derive promissory morality from a conception of autonomy. Kant argues that
“freedom would be depriving itself of the use of its choice” were it not possible to acquire
rights over “external objects of [one’s] choice.” See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of
Morals 68–69 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797). According to
Kant, “another’s choice” is included in the category of “external objects of choice” and
called “contract right”. Id. at 90–91. Kant does not appear to claim that autonomy
specially requires the freedom to bind oneself according to one’s will. Instead, his claim is
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sovereignty, understood as entailing the power to undertake selfimposed moral responsibility, is a fundamental moral value which no
more stands in need of justification than does the claim that reducing
human suffering is morally good. Does it explain, as Hume requires,
how a promise provides the promisor with a reason for action by
explaining how keeping the promise serves some human interest,
without using the notion of obligation? Here I am once again inclined
to follow Raz’s lead:
[T]o the extent that promises are a source of voluntary
obligations they are made by the exercise of normative powers.
The obligatoriness of many promises can no doubt be
explained on other grounds which do not depend on the fact
that promises yield voluntary obligations.
But such
explanations, correct and useful as they are, miss the essential
point in the common conception of promises.25
Furthermore,
Because all types of voluntary obligations are characterized by
being mandatory norms with content-independent justification,
they are justified by the justification of the general norm that
promises . . . ought to be respected; they are not justified by
giving reasons for the desirability of each obligatory act in its
particular circumstances.26
Personal sovereignty itself provides, in Raz’s terms, “the justification
of the general norms that promises ought to be respected.” The
fundamental moral value of according individuals the maximum
permissible control over the moral norms that govern their lives explains
why individuals have the power to make promises and promises provide
reasons for action. According to the personal sovereignty account,
promisors should keep their promises not because of the consequences
of performing or failing to perform the promised act or following or
breaking a general norm of promising, but because morality treats
personal sovereignty as a fundamental value that requires promises to be
kept. Simply put, promisors have reason to keep their promises because
morality requires that promises be kept.
Preferred Citation: Jody S. Kraus, Personal Sovereignty and Normative Power
Skepticism,
109
COLUM.
L.
REV.
SIDEBAR
126
(2009),
http://www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/109/126_Kraus.pdf

that it requires the freedom to receive commitments from others, and thus to have rights
over their choices, analogous to our rights over external goods (i.e., property rights),
whose possibility is similarly essential to full autonomy. Thus, Kant argues that we deprive
the will of its full scope if we confine it to “internal” objects of choice (i.e., our own
actions), excluding external objects of choice (such as other things and other people).
Hence, for Kant, full freedom requires the possibility of property and contracts.
25. Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, 46 Proc. of the
Aristotelian Soc’y (Supplementary Volumes) 79, 98 (1972).
26. Id.

